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COMMENT
JUDICIAL NOTICE OF FOREIGN LAW
In 1936 the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws promulgated
the Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act.1 To date the Act has
been adopted by twenty-eight jurisdictions, including Washington.2
Although the purpose of the Act was commendable, and the moderni-
zation it sought to achieve greatly needed, it seems that further action,
either judicial or legislative is needed in some of the states where it
has been adopted. Reform is particularly necessary in Washington.
This comment will explore the Washington law prior to the enactment
of the Uniform Act, the intent of the Act, and the actual effect that
its enactment has had upon the existing law. The operation of the
Uniform Act in the other jurisdictions will be discussed with a view
toward exposing both its strengths and weaknesses. A comparison of
the rule as to judicial notice of the law of the various states by the
federal courts will also be made. Finally, there will be suggestions for
improvement, both in the way of judicial interpretation and of legis-
lative action.
WASHINGTON LAW PRI OR To ADOPTION OF THE UNIFORM ACT
Very early the Washington court aligned itself with the then pre-
vailing view that foreign law must be pleaded and proved. In 1892
the court stated, "Laws of foreign countries must be pleaded and
proven as any other fact, and in this respect the law of another state
of the union is the law of a foreign country and the court will not take
'Section 1. Every court of this state shall take judicial notice of the common law
and statutes of every state, territory and other jurisdiction of the United States. § 2.
The court may inform itself of such laws in such manner as it may deem proper, and
the court may call upon counsel to aid it in obtaining such information. § 3. The
determination of such laws shall be made by the court and not by the jury, and shall
be reviewable. § 4. Any party may also present to the trial court any admissible
evidence of such laws, but, to enable a party to offer evidence of the law in anotherjurisdiction or to ask that judicial notice be taken thereof, reasonable notice shall be
given to the adverse parties either in the pleadings or otherwise. § 5. The law of ajurisdiction other than those referred to in Section 1 shall be an issue for the court,
but shall not be subject to the foregoing provisions concerning judicial notice. § 6.
This act shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to
make uniform the law of those states which enact it. § 7. This act may be cited as
the Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act. 9A U.L.A. 318 (1957), hereafter
referred to as the Uniform Act.
2 Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Virgin Islands, Washington, Wisconsin, Wyoming.
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judicial notice of it."' That this was the accepted common-law rule
even as late as 1935 is evident from categorical statements in both
Beale's treatise, and the Restatement of Conflicts to the effect that
the law of a sister state must be pleaded and proved.4 The conceptual
underpinning for the rule, as articulated by Beale, is as follows:
Because the court can apply only the law of the forum, foreign law,
insofar as it is relevant, must operate not as law but as fact.5 The
full implications of the rule would be not only that foreign law must be
pleaded, but that the determination of the content of the foreign law
must be a question for the jury, and that the only evidence as to that
"fact?' must not run afoul of the exclusionary rules which have been
developed as part of the law of evidence.
Even before the passage of the Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign
Law Act, however, Washington had moved away from these bizarre
implications. A statute, authorizing proof of foreign statutes by intro-
duction of printed copies thereof which were either published under
the authority of the respective government, or which were commonly
used in the court of that state, was enacted as section 435 of the Code
of 1881. This statute apparently dates from 1854, and now appears
as RCW 5.44.050. The case of Rood v. Horton, decided in 1924, dis-
posed of the idea that foreign law was a jury question, the court
saying, "In our opinion, where proof of foreign laws is necessary to be
introduced, such proof should be addressed to the court and not to the
jury, and the court should interpret the foreign laws for the jury and
instruct the jury thereon."'
Although proof of foreign statutes was simplified by this statute,
proof of foreign case law was not. There seem to be no Washington
cases on this point, but the well accepted rule was that foreign case
law should be proven by expert testimony.'
The pleading requirement as to foreign law raises at least three
questions: How must it be pleaded? Are there any exceptions to the
requirement? What is the effect of failure to plead?
There are no Washington cases in which the court prescribes the
proper method for pleading foreign case law. Presumably the rule
would be that the pleading is acceptable unless it merely states con-
s McDaniel v. Pressler, 3 Wash. 636, 639, 29 Pac. 209, 210 (1892).
43 BEA.E, CONFLICT OF LAws 1665 (1935) ; RESTATEMENT, CoNFLicTs § 621 (1934).
53 BEALE, CONFLICT oF LAws 1664 (1935).
6 Rood v. Horton, 132 Wash. 82, 89, 231 Pac. 450, 452 (1924).
73 BE.L, CONFLICT OF LAVS, 1670 (1935) ; 20 Am. Jua. Evidence § 801 (1939);
Annot. 25 L.R.A. 449 (1894).
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clusions of the pleader.' With respect to the proper method of plead-
ing statutes, the opposite situation prevails. Two cases set forth the
proposition that a foreign statute must be pleaded verbatim.' Another
case, decided between these two, held that introduction of the actual
language of the statute upon trial amounted to an amendment of the
answer, which originally had set forth the statute in effect, but had
not done so verbatim." The most recent case, Allard v. LaPlain"
retreats completely from the verbatim requirement, but does not even
mention the earlier cases. There the defendant urged the court to
consider a Maine statute as giving a defense in the suit on a Maine
judgment. The court said, "This statute is not pleaded in that affirma-
tive defense by copy, but is pleaded in substance and by reference to
section and chapter of the revised statutes of that state, in such manner
that we feel justified in noticing its exact language as found therein."12
Since the earlier cases were not expressly overruled, and were cate-
gorical in establishing a rule contrary to that in the Allard case, one
can only say that the present Washington rule as to the proper manner
to plead a foreign statute is unsettled.
Washington case law presents two exceptions to the rule that foreign
law must be pleaded. A well established exception is that the court
will take judicial notice of the law of another state when suit is brought
on a judgment of that state.' There are, however, two recent cases
which, while recognizing the exception, severely limit it. In Scott v.
Holcomb 4 suit was brought on a New York judgment. New York law
was not pleaded, and the court refused to take judicial notice of New
York law to determine if the defendant's counterclaim should have
been asserted in the New York action and was therefore barred.
Edlin v. Edlin5 was a suit for accrued alimony and child support pay-
ments under a Missouri judgment. Missouri law had been neither
pleaded nor proved, and the court refused to take judicial notice of it,
saying,
8 3 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS 1668 (1935) ; Annot. 134 A.L.R. 570 (1941).
9 Martin Bros. v. Nettleton, 138 Wash. 102, 244 Pac. 386 (1926) ; Lowry v. Moore,
16 Wash. 476, 48 Pac. 238 (1897).
10 Lipsett v. Dettering, 94 Wash. 629, 162 Pac. 1007 (1917).
11 147 Wash. 497, 266 Pac. 688 (1928).
12 Id. at 517, 266 Pac. at 695.
13 Rubin v. Dale, 156 Wash. 676, 288 Pac. 223 (1930) ; Miller v. Miller, 90 Wash.
333, 156 Pac. 8 (1916) ; Trowbridge v. Spinning, 23 Wash. 48, 62 Pac. 125 (1900).
The rationale of this exception is criticized in Comment, 14 WASH. L. REV. 222 (1939)
where the writer points out that the United States Supreme Court has held such a
rule not to be required by the full faith and credit clause.
14 49 Wn.2d 387, 301 P.2d 1068 (1956).
15 42 Wn.2d 445, 256 P.2d 283 (1953).
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[I]n a case such as this, involving a judgment providing for monthly
payments, and where the statute of limitations is involved, and where
the question might arise as to whether particular rights are substantive,
and would thus be governed by the lex loci, or whether such rights are
remedial, and would be governed by the lex fori, a trial judge should
not be required, on his own motion, to ferret out the laws and decisions
of a sister state, but should have such matters properly presented to
him, in order that he may make decisions thereon1-
It would appear from the tone of this last decision that the court is
anxious to keep the exception within narrow limits. Probably the
only issue on which the court will notice foreign law that has not been
pleaded is whether the foreign court had personal jurisdiction over the
defendant based on that state's law as to service of processY
Another exception to the pleading requirement is illustrated in
Matson v. Kennecott Mines Co."8 where suit was brought against a
Nevada corporation for personal injuries incurred while the plaintiff
was working its mines in Alaska. Defendant corporation proved that
it had been dissolved pursuant to Nevada law. Plaintiff was allowed
to introduce a Nevada statute, not previously pleaded, which provided
that a dissolved corporation continued for a year after dissolution for
the purpose of service of process and suit. The court said that no
prior pleading of the statute was required, "in view of the fact that
it was introduced to negative the claimed disincorporation of the
company." 9 Clearly this case holds that there is an additional excep-
tion to the pleading requirement, but the scope of this "negative use"
exception is somewhat conjectural. If the case means that foreign law
need not be pleaded whenever it would be used to negative a conten-
tion by the other party, then the exception is sweeping. The
logical extension of this approach would be that defendants are never
required to plead foreign law, and plaintiffs need not either, when they
meet affirmative defenses. A more restricted rationale for the case
would be in terms of estoppel. Since defendant invoked Nevada law,
the procedure for dissolving a corporation, he cannot now object to
plaintiff's use of Nevada law, even though it was not pleaded. A few
cases in other jurisdictions have used the estoppel concept as a means
of evading the requirement that foreign law be pleaded20
16 Id. at 450-51, 256 P2d at 287.
17 This was the issue for which foreign law was noticed in Trowbridge v. Spinning
supra, note 14.
1s 101 Wash. 12, 171 Pac. 1040 (1918), rev'd on other grounds 103 Wash. 499, 175
Pac. 181 (1918).
'Old. at 29, 171 Pac. at 1045.
20 See Annot., 149 A.L.R. 759 (1944).
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Where the party who wishes to rely on foreign law has failed to
plead it, the rule is well established that the court indulges in the
"presumption" that the applicable foreign law is the same as the law
of the forum.2 Washington even goes so far as to presume that the
foreign jurisdiction has the same statutes that are currently in force
in Washington.22
THE PURPOSE OF THE UNIFORM ACT
Dissatisfaction with the common-law rules that foreign law could not
be judicially noticed, but must be proved, and that the content of
foreign law was a question of fact for the jury led to statutory change.
Proliferation of statutes, each different, led to the promulgation in
1936 of the Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act.23 A factor
which made such a change in the law reasonable and desirable in 1936,
whereas it would not have been so earlier, was the ready accessability
that courts of one state had to the statutes and decisions of the courts
of all the other states.2" With this background, one could at least say
that the purpose of the Act was to dispense with the necessity of pro-
ving foreign law the way material facts must be proven. One could go
further, and say that the purpose of the Act was to eliminate any
distinction between the manner in which foreign law is applied to the
facts of a case, and the manner in which the law of the forum would be
applied. If this was not the purpose of the Act when proposed, and
when adopted by the various states, then this writer believes that this
should be the purpose of legislation in this area.
Both the language of the Act, and contemporaneous statements at
the time of promulgation support the contention that the purpose was
to make the process of ascertaining the applicable law identical, re-
gardless of whether it was "foreign" or "domestic." The label chosen
to describe the process of law-finding which was to substitute for
formal proof was "judicial notice." This is the same term that is
applied to the process by which a judge ascertains the applicable law
21 Chandler v. Doran Co., 44 Wn.2d 396, 267 P.2d 907 (1954) ; Norm Advertising
Inc. v. Monroe St. Lumber Co., 25 Wn.2d 391, 171 P.2d 177 (1946); Smaby v.
Shrauger, 9 Wn.2d 691, 115 P.2d 967 (1941); Walnut Park Lumber & Coal Co. v.
Roane, 171 Wash. 362, 17 P.2d 896 (1933); GooDIcH, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 83, p. 235(3rd ed. 1949) ; RESTATEIENT, CONFLICTS § 622 (1934).
22 Nissen v. Gatlin, 60 Wn.2d 259, 373 P.2d 491 (1962).
23 Commissioners' Prefatory Note, UNIFORM JUDICIAL NOTICE OF FOREIGN LAW
ACT, 9A U.L.A. 318 (1957) ; Committee on Improvements in the Law of Evidence,
Section of Judicial Administration, Report, 63 A.B.A. REP. 593 (1938).
24 Nussbaum, The Problem of Proving Foreign Law, 50 YALE L.J. 1018, 1021
(1941); Committee on Improvements in the Law of Evidence, Report, op. cit. supra,
note 23 at 593.
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in a purely domestic case." Judicial notice was a concept with a fairly
well-defined meaning when the Act was drafted. The draftsmen must
have meant that meaning to be attached to the term as used in the
statute. Generally, judicial notice means that the court is free from
the exclusionary rules of evidence, and that a judge is free to make
independent inquiry." In the report which indorsed the Uniform Act,
the Committee on Improvements in the Law of Evidence of the
American Bar Association indicated the manner in which counsel
would invoke judicial notice: "by producing the statutes and decisions
of that state for information of the court."2 Obviously this is the
same manner in which counsel would present domestic law to the court.
There are two elements in section 4 of the Uniform Act that are
inconsistent with the contention that the purpose of the Act was to
have the court find and apply foreign law in the same way that
domestic law is handled. The first of these elements is the use of the
term "admissible evidence."2 " This is indeed a peculiar phrase to find
in a statute purporting to authorize judicial notice. As argued earlier,
judicial notice and admissible evidence are inconsistent concepts.
Part of the meaning of judicial notice is that the exclusionary rules of
evidence will not be applied. Why this phrase was used is a mystery.
Perhaps the only explanation is that old ideas die slowly.
Section 4 of the Uniform Act also provides that the party intending
to request judicial notice of foreign law must give reasonable notice to
the adverse party, either in the pleadings or otherwise. 9 It is clear
from the accompanying Commissioners' notes that the primary purpose
of this section was to prevent one party from surprising the other.
This notice requirement is clearly an intentional addition to the pro-
cess of presenting foreign law which is not present when only domestic
law is to be used. It is believed that this is the only real distinction
which the draftsmen intended to make between the presentation of
domestic and foreign law.
EFFECT OF THE WASINGTON STATUTE
In 1941 the Washington legislature enacted a statute which pur-
ported to be the Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act. 0 In
2S McCoRmxC, EVIDENCE § 326 (1954).
261d. § 323.
27 Committee on Improvements in the Law of Evidence, Report, supra note 23, at
593.
2S "Any party may also present to the trial court any admissible evidence of such
laws .. . ." (Emphasis added.)
29 Supra note 1.
30 Wash. Sess. Laws 1941, ch. 82.
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fact the Washington act differed from the Uniform Act in one
important detail. In lieu of section 4 of the Uniform Act which was
intended to require notice from one party to the other that foreign law
would be introduced, and which provided that this notice could be
given "either in the pleadings or otherwise," section 4 of the Washing-
ton act substituted the following:
This act shall not be construed to relieve any party of the duty of
hereafter pleading such laws where required under the law and practice
of this state immediately prior to the enactment hereof.3
Thus in Washington pleading is now absolutely necessary, not merely
one of several ways of giving notice to the opponent of intent to rely
on foreign law.
One might think that such a change would surely have been made
intentionally by the legislature, but it is believed that such is not the
case. The law enacted in 1941 and the bill as originally introduced in
the 1941 session are identical." The bill was introduced by Senator
Duggan, chairman of the Senate judiciary committee, and a member
of the judicial council. Prior to 1941 the following events had taken
place: A bill embodying the Uniform Act as drafted by the Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws had been introduced in the 1937 legis-
lature,3 but did not pass, although it passed the House by a vote of
ninety-one to nothing, 4 and received a "do-pass" recommendation
from the Senate judiciary committee. 3 In 1939 the Evidence Section
of the Committee on Judicial Administration of the Washington State
Bar Association recommended that the act as drafted by the Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws be enacted. 6 In 1941 the judicial
council recommended the passage of the Uniform Act, as it appeared
in House Bill No. 242 of the 1937 Session.3
The interesting fact is that while the judicial council does not inti-
mate in the text of its report that the statute it recommends is different
from the Uniform Act, the statute as set out in the appendix to that
31 Wash. Sess. Laws 1941, ch. 82, § 4; currently codified as RCW 524.040.
32 S.B. 28, 1941 Sess.
33 H.B. 242, 1937 Sess.
34 H.R. JouR., 1937 Sess., p. 679.
35 S. JouR., 1937 Sess., p. 655.
3614 WASH. L. REv. 342 (1939).
37 The Judcial Council made its recommendation as follows: "An act entitled Uni-
form Judicial Notice of Foreign Laws Act which was introduced in the 1937 session
of the legislature as House Bill No. 242, passing the House by a vote of ninety-one
to nothing and apparently being lost in the Senate after having been recommended by
the Senate Judiciary Committee for passage, is recommended by the Council for
adoption in the 1941 session of the legislature and is attached hereto as Appendix M."
Seventh Report of Judicial Council 9 (1941).
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report is different. It is here for the first time that the substituted
section 4 appears. Since the Uniform Act as originally drawn had
been approved by the American Bar Association, the Washington Bar
Association, the House of Representatives in 1937, and apparently, but
not actually, by the judicial council in 1941, and since the act which
was introduced in 1941 purported to be the Uniform Act, it seems
quite possible that the substituted section 4 was slipped in without
the majority of the legislature being aware of the change. It is at least
arguable that the legislators who finally approved the bill thought that
they were approving the Uniform Act in its original form. The point is
that these facts would argue against any contention that the substituted
section 4 indicates clear legislative purpose to restrict the operation of
the statute.
In brief, one can say that the adoption of this peculiar version of
the Uniform Act has done little to ameliorate the problems involved in
placing foreign law before a Washington court. One purpose of the
act-making determination of the foreign law a question for the judge
instead of the jury-had already been achieved in Washington through
case law since 1924.88 The other purpose of the act-elimination of
the difference between presentment of foreign and domestic law-was
partially frustrated from the beginning by the substituted section 4
which expressly retained the prior law as to pleading. Any hope that
the apparently restrictive section would be softened by a liberal
judicial interpretation was dashed when the court decided Allen v.
Saccomanno in 1952."0 The suit was for personal injuries incurred in
a collision between plaintiff's car and defendant's bulldozer in Idaho.
The court said:
We have considered this case in the light of the Idaho statutes govern-
ing the operation of motor vehicles which were pleaded. No decisions
of the Supreme Court of Idaho upon this subject were pleaded, nor
was any effort made to amend the pleadings to include them. Our
consideration of them, as a matter of judicial notice, is prevented by
RCW 5.24.040 ... 40
A more restrictive approach to a remedial statute could hardly be
imagined. The court took a section of a statute intended to allow
foreign law to be applied freely, and used it as the reason for refusing
to consider foreign law.
8s Rood v. Horton, supra note 5.
89 40 Wn2d 283, 242 P2d 747 (1952).401d. at 285, 242 P.2d at 748. (Emphasis added.)
1963l
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
Another decision of the Washington court adopted an unnecessarily
restrictive interpretation of section 2 of the Act. State v. Jackovick"1
was an action to find the defendant to be an habitual criminal. At
issue was the question whether offenses for which the defendant had
been convicted in Minnesota were felonies in Washington. Inter-
preting section 2 of the Uniform Act,"2 the court said, "This section
has been interpreted not to require courts to take judicial notice of
the law of another state, unless pertinent decisions or statutes are
called to its attention in the records or briefs; but a court may, on its
own motion, inform itself of such foreign law."43 As will be seen
hereafter, Washington is not alone in its effort to protect judges from
doing the work of counsel, but it is submitted that this solicitude is not
only unnecessary, but conflicts with the clear meaning of section 1 of
the Act which is not permissive, but mandatory."
Perhaps adoption of the statute has changed the Washington law
in the area of proof. Certainly if case law of a sister state is properly
pleaded it is no longer necessary to adduce additional proof in the
form of expert testimony, affidavits, or depositions from attorneys or
others familiar with the foreign law. But even in the area of proof
the statutory law has not changed drastically because under the proof
of statutes act 45 a copy of the foreign statute was sufficient.
THE UNIFORM ACT IN OTHER STATES
The Uniform Act has met with varying degrees of success in the
states which have adopted it. There are many cases in which the
statute has obviously achieved the purpose of eliminating the old
common-law rule of pleading and proof of foreign law because the
courts simply say that they are authorized to take judicial notice of
the law of sister states, and then proceed to do so." There are, how-
41 56 Wn.2d 915, 255 P.2d 976 (1960).
42 RCW 5.24.020: "The court may inform itself of such laws in such manner as it
may deem proper, and the court may call upon counsel to aid it in obtaining such
information."
4 56 Wn.2d at 918-19, 355 P.2d at 978.
44 RCW 5.24.010 "Every court of this state shall take judicial notice.... " (Em-
phasis added.)
45 RCW 5.44.050.
46 Hotchkiss v. Martin, 52 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 1951) ; Meenen v. Meenen, 178 Kan.
510, 289 P.2d 766 (1955) ; Fischer v. Kipp, 177 Kan. 196, 277 P.2d 598 (1954);
Leiserson & Adler Inc. v. Keam, 266 S.W.2d 352 (Ky. 1954) ; Gourley v. Miller, 302
Ky. 759, 196 S.W.2d 360 (1946) ; Malcom v. Stondall Land & Invest. Co., 129 Mont.
142, 284 P.2d 258 (1955) ; In re Hunter's Estate, 125 Mont. 315, 236 P.2d 94 (1951) ;
Snyder v. Lincoln, 153 Neb. 611, 45 N.W.2d 749 (1951) ; Fitzgerald v. Chemical
Serv. Corp., 84 Ohio App. 423, 84 N.E.2d 754 (1948) ; Application of Lorenz, 194
Ore. 355, 241 P.2d 142 (1952); Hansen v. Hansen, 274 Wis. 262, 80 N.W2d 230(1956).
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ever, some problems which have shown up. The cases under the
Uniform Act discuss whether it is still necessary to plead foreign law,
the duty of counsel to inform the court, and various problems sur-
rounding the notice requirement of section 4 of the Act. There have
also been some interesting statutory modifications of the Uniform Act.
Whether the Uniform Act abolished the requirement that foreign
law must be pleaded has, oddly enough, been a bothersome question.
Some courts felt that it was necessary to state in so many words that
the pleading requirement as such had been abolished, having been
replaced by a notice requirement which might take the form of plead-
ing, or some other form." Two states, Florida and Nebraska, seem
to require that foreign law must be pleaded even under the Uniform
Act. Florida originally started off with a liberal interpretation of the
Act. In Peterson v. Paoli8 the court held that the. Uniform Act re-
quired it to notice New York law, including a statute which had been
overlooked in the lower court. Several subsequent 'decisions of the
Florida court have retreated drastically from this position, until now
it seems clear not only that foreign law must be pleaded, 9 but that
statutes should be pleaded by section number," and case law should
be pleaded by citation and not by general tenor only.51 Nebraska also
seems to have a similarly strict pleading requirement. Scott v. Scott"2
was a suit for separate maintenance. The issue was whether there had
been a ceremonial marriage in South Dakota or a common-law mar-
riage in Iowa. Defendant had pleaded generally that there was no
common-law marriage in Iowa. The court refused to apply either the
law of South Dakota or the law of Iowa, giving this interpretation of
the Uniform Act:
The foregoing statutes were not intended to remove the necessity of
pleading and presenting the common law or statutes of another juris-
diction of the United States when recovery based thereon is sought in
an action brought in this state to enforce a cause of action arising
thereunder. It only removes the requirement of proving it. A 'court
may require that it be pleaded and presented."
4 7 Fardy v. Mayerstein, 221 Ind. 339, 47 N.E.2d 966 (1943); Poteet v. Simmons,
172 Kan. 310, 240 P.2d 147 (1952); Vogt v. Power's Adm'r[x], 291 S.W2d 840
(Ky. 1956).
48 44 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 1950).
49 Miler v. Shulman, 122 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 1960); Aboandandolo v. Vonella, 88
So. 2d 282 (Fla. 1956) ; Lanigan v. Lanigan, 78 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 1955).
&0 Pacific Mills v. Hillman Garment Inc., 87 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1956).51 Kingston v. Quimby, 80 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1955).
52 153 Neb. 906, 46 N.W.2d 627 (1951).
53 Id. 46 N.W2d at 630-31.
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It is possible that the impact of this decision has since been softened,
although it is difficult to determine to what extent. In Abramson v.
Abramson54 the same issue was presented on almost identical facts.
The plaintiff had alleged in her complaint that the parties "were law-
fully married on September 5, 1929 in Clarinda, Iowa." The court
held that this was sufficient pleading to authorize judicial notice of
Iowa law, but instead of overruling Scott v. Scott, purported to follow
it, quoting the same excerpt set out above. Who knows what the
Nebraska rule is now.
It is quite likely that the retention by Florida and Nebraska of a
pleading requirement under the Uniform Act is related to another idea
expressed by courts when they interpret the Act-that the duty of
ascertaining the foreign law falls on counsel and not on the court.
Since it seems that this idea is not really unique to the area of foreign
law, but rather is a basic premise of our judicial system, it is difficult
to understand why the courts have chosen the area of foreign law to
articulate this duty. The leading case on this point is Strout v.
Burgess5 where the court said:
Unless pertinent decisions or statutes of foreign jurisdictions are called
to our attention either in the record or in the briefs, and if no evidence
as to the foreign law is offered . . . it is not the duty of the court to
inform itself thereof, suo moto. We do not mean to deny our authority
to do so. 56
While the court is no doubt correct in what it says, it is submitted
that there is nothing to gain, and a real chance of retarding the de-
velopment of the law, by saying this in the context of a discussion
about judicial notice of foreign law. if courts focus on their right not
to notice foreign law unless counsel bring it to their attention, they
might lose sight of the clear commandment of the first section of the
Uniform Act that they shall take notice of foreign law. Further, in
emphasizing that the function of the pleadings or the record is to place
the foreign law before the court rather than to give notice to the ad-
verse party, courts have added something to the Act which was not
intended. Obviously a pleading must be much more specific and
detailed if it is meant to apprise the court of the entire law of another
54161 Neb. 782, 74 N.W.2d 919 (1956).
55 144 Me. 263, 68 A.2d 241 (1949).
56 Id. 68 A.2d at 250; accord, Roberts v. Robben, 188 Kan. 217, 362 P.2d 29, 31
(1961) ; Succession of Shadrick, 129 So. 2d 606, 613 (La. 1961) ; State v. Jackovick,
56 Wn.2d 915, 918, 355 P.2d 976, 978 (1960) ; Edlin v. Edlin, 42 Wn.2d 445, 450-51,
256 P.2d 283, 287 (1953).
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state on a particular point than if it is meant only to apprise the op-
posing counsel of the possibility that foreign law will be argued. Fear
of imposition upon judges then results in the erection of barriers to
judicial notice of foreign law. It could be just this fear which led the
courts of Florida and Nebraska to retain a pleading requirement by
judicial interpretation, and which led to the surreptitious insertion of
a pleading requirement in the Uniform Act as adopted in Washington.
Even in those states in which it is recognized that the only real
requirement of the Uniform Act is notice to the opposing party that
judicial notice of foreign law will be requested, there is some divergence
of opinion about how such notice should be given, what the effect
of failure to notify should be, and whether there is some exception
to the notice requirement. Apparently where the party wishing to
rely on foreign law has not given the required notice, the trial court
is not required to take judicial notice of the foreign law. 7 However,
it would seem that where the trial court did take notice of foreign
law even though one party had not expressly notified the other, this
would not normally be prejudicial error, because if the correct law
was applied, the result would be the same even if the case were re-
manded for a new trial. One case so holds." Assuming that the primary
objective of section 4 of the Act is to insure that opposing counsel
is not taken by surprise when foreign law is argued at trial, 9 one
might think that allegations of fact which clearly showed that by the
applicable conflicts rule foreign law should be applied, would be
sufficient to put a competent attorney on notice that foreign law
would be argued. However, there is only sparse case authority for
this position,"0 and almost all of the cases which refused to take
judicial notice because there had been no notice given would be
contra. 1
57 Hogan v. Q.T. Corp., 230 Md. 69, 185 A2d 491 (1962) ; Estate of Gallagher v.
Battle, 209 Md. 592, 122 A.2d 93 (1956) ; Maccabees v. Lipps, 182 Md. 190, 34 A.2d
424 (1943) ; Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Shumaker, 178 Md. 189, 12 A2d 618
(1940) ; Smith v. Brooks, 154 Neb. 93, 47 N.W.2d 389 (1951) ; Cliff v. Pinto, 74 R.I.
369, 60 A.2d 704 (1948).
58 Patterson v. Consumers Roofing Co., 209 Minn. 50, 295 N.W. 401 (1940).
59 The Commissioners' notes to § 4 of the Uniform Act, 9A U.L.A. 326 (1957)
give an illustration that indicates this is the primary objective: "For example, if a
plaintiff sued in Minnesota for damage done to freight by a railroad, and on the
trial the plaintiff invokes the law of Illinois because the bill of lading was issued in
Illinois, and if the plaintiff is ready with books of Illinois law, it is unfair to the
opponent not to have given him notice that the Illinois law will be relied upon."6o Commercial Credit Corp. v. Fatz, 346 Ill. App. 541, 105 N.E2d 789 (1952);
Meyers v. Columbia Cas. Co., 81 Ohio App. 434, 78 N.E2d 64 (1947) ; but see Bowling
v. Bowling, 62 Ohio L. Abs. 178, 100 N.E2d 725 (1951).
61 Note 54 supra.
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It is, of course, possible to allege something in the pleading in addi-
tion to facts which will be sufficient to give notice to the opposing
party. In Lorch v. Eglin62 the defendant's answer alleged that the
plaintiff's cause of action was governed by Virginia law and that
under Virginia law the plaintiff could not recover, and added, "All
of which defendants aver to be true and expect to be able to prove at
the trial of the cause."6 This was held sufficient notice. In Revlett
v. Louisville & N. R. Co.,6 the court held that a simple allegation
that the law of a sister state controlled was sufficient to give notice
of intent to rely on that law. An example of conservative practice
is that followed in Gordon's Transports Inc. v. Bailey65 where the de-
fendant's attorney not only pleaded applicable foreign statutes, but
served upon plaintiff's attorney a memorandum of the foreign authori-
ties on which he intended to rely. Under section 4 of the Uniform
Act as originally drafted, notice can be given by means of a separate
document, as well as by being expressly or impliedly contained in the
pleadings."6
Where there has been no notice either by pleading, or by separate
document, it is still possible for the court to be authorized to take
judicial notice of the foreign law where the parties stipulate that the
law of another jurisdiction should apply." It also appears to be possi-
ble for the parties in effect to stipulate that the law of the forum will
be applied even though the applicable conflicts rule would indicate
otherwise, simply by refusing to present and argue foreign law to the
court.66 The propriety of these decisions is seriously open to question
in view of the policy behind the whole idea of conflict of laws-that
the same law should be applied to the rights of the parties no matter
where the case is tried. 9
Another situation in which express or implied notice is not required
62369 Pa. 314, 85 A.2d 841 (1952).
63 Id. 85 A.2d at 842, n2.
64 144 Ind. App. 187, 51 N.E.2d 95 (1943).
6541 Tenn. App. 365, 294 S.W.2d 313 (1956).
66 Steger v. Egyud, 219 Md. 331, 149 A.2d 762 (1959) ; Wilson v. Dailey, 191 Md.
472, 62 A.2d 284 (1948) ; United Factors Corp. v. Mogul, 142 Pa. Super. 506, 16 A.2d
735 (1940) ; Kennedy v. Lenzine, 76 R.I. 231, 69 A.2d 231 (1949).
67 Moscov v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 387 Ill. 378, 56 N.E.2d 399 (1944);
Staley v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore, 189 Md. 447, 56 A.2d 144 (1947);
Morneault v. Boston & M. R.R., 144 Me. 300, 68 A.2d 260 (1949) ; Colozzi v. Beuko
Inc., 17 N.J. 194, 110 A.2d 545 (1954).
68 Tracy v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 34 Del. Ch. 207, 101 A.2d 321 (1953)
Alexander v. Hergenroeder, 215 Md. 326, 138 A.2d 366 (1958).
69 GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 4 (1949).
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occurs when one party has pleaded certain portions of foreign law)
or has indicated that he will rely on foreign law, and the opposing
party requests judicial notice of other portions of the foreign law.
The party who has first interjected foreign law into the case is
estopped from claiming that he was not given notice that his oppon-
ent intends to rely on foreign law."0
There have been some statutory modifications of the Uniform Act
which have greatly aided the goal of placing foreign law before the
court with a minimun of procedural barriers. Missouri has the Uni-
form Act in its original form,7 but has adopted a court rule which
greatly simplifies the matters discussed above, and apparently this
works quite well. In effect the rule clearly accomplishes what only
one or two courts came to through interpretation-namely that allega-
tions of fact alone will for the most part be sufficient notice to the
other party that foreign law will be relied on."'
Of particular interest to Washington is the New Jersey experience.
Prior to 1960 New Jersey also had a pleading requirement in its
version of the Uniform Act. But even with the requirement in the
statute, the New Jersey court was much more liberal than was the
Washington Court. In Axinn Co. v. Gibraltar Dev. Inc.,8 the court
said:
Although the law of New York was not pleaded under section 1 of our
Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act, or even mentioned in the
trial court, this court may, under section 2 of that act, "inform itself of
such laws in such manner as it may deem proper .... ." The act is
remedial and should be liberally interpreted.74
Compare the statement by the Washington court, interpreting the
pleading requirement in Allen v. Saccomanno: "No decisions of the
Supreme Court of Idaho upon this subject were pleaded, nor was any
effort made to amend the pleadings to include them. Our considera-
tion of them, as a matter of judicial notice, is prevented by RCW
70 Gross v. Fraser, 140 Mont. 95, 368 P2d 163 (1962) ; Continental Assur. Co. v.
Henson, 297 Ky. 764, 181 S.W2d 431 (1944).
71VER oN's ANN. Mo. STAT. §§ 490.070.-120 (1949).
72 "In every action or proceeding wherein the pleading states that the law of
another state is relied upon or contains allegations which show that the law of another
state must be applied, the courts of this state shall take judicial notice of the public
statutes and judicial decisions of said state. The court may inform itself of such laws
in such manner as it may deem proper, and may call upon counsel to aid it in ob-
taining such information." VERNoN's Awn. Mo. RuLEs, Rule 5523 (b).
72 45 N.J. Super. 523, 133 A2d 341 (1957).
74Id. 133 A2d at 347.
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5.24.040 .... 117' New Jersey also allowed its pleading requirement
to be waived by stipulation of the parties.76 Notwithstanding the fact
that the process of taking judicial notice was going well, New Jersey
in 1960 amended its statute to eliminate the pleading requirement
and to substitute the alternatives of pleading or notice at or before
pre-trial conference, or ten days before trial.
Oregon has also modified its statute, with apparently beneficial
results. In 1937 Oregon adopted the Uniform Act as originally pro-
posed. However, in 1945, section 4 of the Act, which has produced
most of the litigation because of the various interpretations of the
notice requirement, was amended to eliminate completely any require-
ment of noticeY.7  A subsequent Oregon case gives an illustration of
how judicial notice of foreign law should work. Estate of Schultz"9
was a suit to determine heirship. The plaintiff claimed the right to
inherit from the decedent because of an agreement to adopt which had
been made in Nebraska. The court said, "Notwithstanding that the
lex loci bearing on the enforcement of this kind of contract is not
here pleaded, we will . . . take notice of the foreign law as far as
may be necessary to resolve the question."8 The court then examined
Nebraska law, found that the agreement had the effect in Nebraska
of making the plaintiff an heir of the decedent, and allowed her to
inherit. The applicable Oregon law would have required formal court
proceedings; hence, had the court refused to apply Nebraska law and
sought refuge in the presumption that the foreign law was the same
as the law of the forum, the plaintiff would have lost. By comparison
to the action of the Washington court in Nissen v. Gatlin,"' where in
the absence of proper pleading the presumption was indulged that
Alaska had a statute identical with that of Washington, the superiority
of the Oregon approach is apparent. The statutes of Alaska are now
readily available. If one of them was relevant to the outcome of the
case, the court in the Nissen case could easily have found the appro-
priate statute and applied it. The status of applicable case law is
more difficult to ascertain than the language of a statute, but the
Oregon court in Schultz undertook the task anyway, so that the
rights of the parties would be decided under the appropriate law.
75 40 Wn.2d 283, 285, 242 P.2d 747, 748 (1952).
76 Colozzi v. Beuko Inc., 17 N.J. 194, 110 A.2d 545 (1954).
7 N.J. Acts, 1960, ch. 52 § 48.
78 Ore. Sess. Laws 1945, ch. 281 § 1.
79220 Ore. 350, 348 P.2d 22 (1959).
80 Id. 348 P.2d at 26.
8160 Wn.2d 259, 373 P.2d 491 (1962).
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JuDcIAL NOTICE IN FEDERAL COURTS
The problem presented is whether federal courts, under the doctrine
of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins" are required to follow the judicial notice
rule of the state where the court is sitting. There has been no Supreme
Court decision on this point, and the decisions of the lower federal
courts are not clear. Some commentators think that, in diversity cases,
at least, Erie requires the federal courts to follow the state rule as to
judicial notice of foreign law." However, the opposite view is ex-
pressed in Moore's Federal Practice.4 It appears that Moore is cor-
rect, and that the current federal rule is that a federal court is not
bound by the state rule on judicial notice. Parkway Baking Co. v.
Freikoffer Baking Co.,85 is an illustration of the present law in the
federal courts. In that case suit was begun in Pennsylvania, but under
the appropriate conflicts rule interpretation of the contract in question
would be determined by Illinois law. One party objected to applica-
tion of Illinois law because it had not been raised below and because
the other party had not given the notice required by the Pennsylvania
Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act. In rejecting this argument the
court said, "Neither the failure of National to raise the issue of Illinois
law below, nor its lack of compliance with the Pennsylvania Judicial
Notice Act can bar our application of Illinois law on this appeal."86
Thus the federal courts are now operating the way that each state
court should operate. The law, from whatever source, is presented
and argued in only one way, and the law that should be applied, is
applied, without regard to artificial barriers long since outdated.
SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORm IN WASHINGTON
Assuming that the desired goal is the identity of procedure which
is exemplified by federal practice, and which was intended by the
draftsmen of the Uniform Act, what can be done in Washington?
Obviously, something needs to be done, in view of the bizarre results
of the Nissen and Allen cases." Even though the statute now in
force has an express pleading requirement, one might hope that the
Washington court would follow the lead of New Jersey, and read the
82304 U.S. 64 (1938).83 Keefe, Landis & Shaad, Sense and Nonsense About Judicial Notice, 2 STAN. L.
REv. 664, 688 (1950).
84 1A MooR's FEDaauL PRACTicE 0.316[4] (2d ed. 1961). This section discusses
the relevant cases so completely that further discussion here is unnecessary.
85 255 F2d 641 (3d Cir. 1958).
86 Id. at 646.
87 See text accompanying note 81 supra.
88 See text accompanying note 81 supra.
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statute liberally instead of restrictively.89 Legislation is the more
likely salvation in this area, however. It is not so much that new
statutes are needed, but rather elimination of portions of the existing
statutes is needed. Oregon's experience after having entirely removed
the provision for notice and/or pleading seems to be satisfactory.
RCW 5.24.040 could be repealed. Should bench or bar remain uneasy,
then some provision for notice to the adverse party could be supplied
in a court rule, as was done in Missouri. The rule adopted there,
making facts alone sufficient notice if they show foreign law should
be applied under a recognized conflicts rule, appears to be a good one.
It is interesting to note that the Uniform Rules of Evidence, promul-
gated by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 195390 do not
include a notice requirement. Rule 9 (1) treats judicial notice of the
law of sister states in the same manner as judicial notice of facts
generally known to courts.9 Washington could repeal all of RCW
ch. 5.24 and substitute Rule 9 (1) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence
without losing any of the advantages of the Uniform Act, and thereby
gain much more freedom for both judges and attorneys. Of course,
if the Uniform Rules of Evidence should be adopted in toto, then
RCW ch. 5.24 would be superseded. Pending such wholesale revision
of Washington law, the minor statutory changes suggested above
could be made. Even if no statutory changes are made, the court
should adopt a liberal interpretation of the existing statute.
ROBERT L. BEALE
89 See Axinn Co. v. Gibraltar Dev. Inc., 45 N.J. Super. 523, 133 A2d 341 (1957);
Colozzi v. Beuko Inc., 17 N.J. 194, 110 A.2d 545 (1954) ; and Franzen v. Equitable
Life Assur. Soc. of United States, where the court says, "it is a remedial statute;
and on well-settled principles the language is to be given a liberal interpretation to
suppress the mischief and advance the remedy." 130 N.J.L. 957, 33 A.2d at 602-03.
90 9A U.L.A. (Supp. 1962, 159).
91 Rule 9 (1) "Judicial notice shall be taken without request by a party, of the
common law, constitutions and public statutes in force in every state, territory and
jurisdiction of the United States, and of such specific facts and propositions of general-
ized knowledge as are so universally known that they cannot reasonably be the subject
of dispute." 9A U.L.A. (Supp. 1962, 166).
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